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An influential literature in psychology claims that self-deception is char-
acteristic of mental health. Most notably, Shelley Taylor, in a series of 
works that touches three decades, argues that “positive illusions” con-
tribute to the production of better mood, better popularity, better ability 
to care for others, creativity, productivity, resilience from stress, and ul-
timately happiness.1 So Taylor is enamored of the “adaptiveness” of hu-
man positive illusions.2 Not having them is the hallmark of depression. 
Having them is a great boon (with a few qualifiers for when they get too 
extreme). Her work is not explicitly normative, but it seems to me to 
have the implication that many illusions she discusses are to be encour-
aged. Fully realistic assessments of oneself are not prized. 
 The question I shall be concerned with is normative. I shall ask: If we 
desire happiness, is it practically rational to pursue policies of self-
deception? Although Taylor does not address this question specifically, 
her work might inspire one to answer in the affirmative. 
 To be precise, the reasoning I wish to refute is as follows. Having 
beliefs about oneself that are positive (flattering, make oneself out to be 
admirable, and so on) leads to happiness; work such as Taylor’s in social 
                                                 
 1Taylor doesn’t distinguish positive illusions from self-deception. See section 2 for a 
distinction between self-deception and a type of bias I call “self-inflation.” The locus 
classicus of the series I’m referring to is Shelley E. Taylor, Positive Illusions: Creative 
Self-Deception and the Healthy Mind (New York: Basic Books, 1989). This is the piece 
to which I will be most concerned to respond, since it is highly influential and attempts to 
integrate the most research. But there are a number of other pieces that purport to support 
the conclusions of Positive Illusions. See, for example: Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon 
D. Brown, “Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction,” 
Psychological Bulletin 116 (1994): 21-27; Shelley E. Taylor, Margaret E. Kemeny, Geof-
frey M. Reed, Julienne E. Bower, and Tara L. Gruenewald, “Psychological Resources, 
Positive Illusions, and Health,” American Psychologist 55 (2000): 99-109; Shelley E. 
Taylor, Jennifer S. Lerner, David K. Sherman, Rebecca M. Sage, and Nina K. McDowell, 
“Are Self-Enhancing Cognitions Associated with Healthy or Unhealthy Biological Pro-
files?” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85 (2003): 605-15. 
 2Taylor doesn’t use “adaptive” in the sense offered by the theory of natural selection, 
but rather in sense of useful in life or productive of mental health. 
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psychology shows that this is true even when such beliefs depart from 
the truth in being overly self-flattering. In order to achieve happiness, 
therefore, it is a good idea to pursue a policy of self-deception concern-
ing the self and one’s situation, making self and situation out to be better 
than frank appraisal would support. (Again, I don’t attribute this reason-
ing to Taylor herself, but hold that her work suggests it.) 
 I argue, on the contrary, that self-honesty is a superior policy to self-
deception, if one wishes to achieve happiness. There are three sides to 
my overall argument.  
 First, I argue that Shelley Taylor’s work, empirical and otherwise, 
cannot properly be used to support the target reasoning. This is because: 
(i) Taylor misapplies the notion of illusion to cases of self-fulfilling be-
lief that, although possibly conducive to happiness, needn’t be illusory; 
(ii) Taylor misconstrues imagining positive outcomes as part of planning 
as illusion; and (iii) Taylor fails to show that the beliefs resulting from 
what we might call self-inflation bias are the kind of beliefs needed for 
happiness.  
 Second, I give three arguments that a policy of self-deception does 
not produce choiceworthy happiness. The first two of these arguments 
even support the contrary claim: self-deception leads to unhappiness. I 
hold: (a) self-deception, as a producer of false belief, undermines one’s 
ability to satisfy one’s desires; (b) self-deception creates an anxiety-
provoking internal tension in the mind of the self-deceiver; and (c) self-
deception could only produce happiness in a thin sense, which I call Ma-
trix happiness.  
 Third, I argue that an effective route to happiness lies in honest imag-
ining, which involves honesty with oneself about one’s own abilities and 
the offerings of one’s environment, and positive imagination about what 
to do with abilities and environment.  
 
 
2. The Ideas in Question 
 
Before turning to these arguments, let’s stabilize the notions under inves-




What do I mean by “happiness”? Some hold that an array of pleasurable 
or positive feelings constitutes happiness. Others hold that having certain 
genuine “external” goods—health, friends, activities, enjoyable posses-
sions—is required as well.  
 I hold that both positive feelings and the possession of genuine exter-
nal goods are constituents of happiness. Nor are they neatly separable. 
 Self-Deception Won’t Make You Happy 109 
 
 
Human relationships (having friends) would, by most lights, fall in the 
category of external goods. But a relationship is not one we desire with-
out mutually held positive feelings; so the relationship, usually thought 
of as an external good, does not exist without the pleasurable sentiment, 
usually thought of as an internal good. Relationships thus don’t fall 
neatly into either category. Furthermore, activities need a favorable envi-
ronment to be possible and have mental components; they defy the di-
chotomy as well. Nevertheless, let’s treat external goods and internal 
positive sentiments as separable for now, since doing so will help us see 
some useful distinctions.3  
 One may have positive sentiments or not; and one may have genuine 
external goods or not. There are thus four categories of interest.  
 First, having neither external goods nor positive sentiments is misery.  
 Second, suppose one is arrayed with a fine panoply of genuine exter-
nal goods but largely lacks positive sentiments in life. I call this state of 
affairs the Woody Allen condition, after Woody Allen’s character in the 
film “Manhattan,” who is largely successful in life and is dating a beauti-
ful young woman, but who lacks positive sentiments about his state of 
affairs. The Woody Allen condition is not just a form of depression; de-
pression involves loss of motivation and hence leads to inactivity, but 
neither of these problems (necessarily) obtains in the Woody Allen con-
dition. 
 Third, one may have positive, pleasurable sentiments without having 
much or anything by way of genuine goods. I call this Matrix happiness, 
after the film “The Matrix,” in which humans are kept in cells by artifi-
cially intelligent robots and kept in a (relatively) positive-feeling state of 
mind by a massive computer program that influences their conscious ex-
perience. The happiness of most humans in that film did not include 
genuine external goods.  
 Fourth, if one has genuine external goods and positive sentiments, 
one has choiceworthy happiness. I say “choiceworthy” because even the 
advocate of the view that only sentiments are needed for happiness 
would choose this form of happiness, if given the option.4 Choiceworthy 
                                                 
 3My way of framing things here owes much to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, al-
though I do not want to present any of my views as being an interpretation of Aristotle.  
 4Alfred Mele has pointed out in personal communication that there are some compli-
cations here. The various types of happiness come in degrees and vary along multiple 
dimensions. In saying that even the proponent of Matrix happiness would choose 
choiceworthy happiness, I am assuming a choice in which the latter has everything the 
former has and more. The situation gets trickier if we’re faced with a choice between a 
very intense Matrix happiness and a low-level form of choiceworthy happiness. I won’t 
attempt to give a systematic theory of how to negotiate that trade-off here, as doing so 
would be an entirely different project. But my arguments in later sections are relevant to 
this issue. Basically, most Matrix happiness that would come in a trade-off with choice-
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happiness is, I believe, more stable than either the Woody Allen condi-
tion or Matrix happiness. Matrix happiness is likely to be intruded upon 
often by the natural connection between people’s perception of the world 
around them and their sentiments. The Woody Allen condition is likely 
to devolve into depression and then misery.5 

















Matrix happiness Misery 
 
 A couple of clarifying points are in order.  
 First, concepts of happiness or unhappiness can be applied globally or 
locally. Globally, one discusses a person’s overall state of happiness; 
locally, one speaks of a person’s happiness in a certain area of life. It’s 
generally assumed that one’s global happiness is largely a function of 
aggregated local areas of happiness. I make the analogous assumptions 
using the distinctions I draw here. For example, if one has local Matrix 
happiness in many areas of life, the person will be Matrix happy glob-
ally; and so on. 
 Second, just as believing one has external goods is not sufficient for 
having them, believing one has positive feelings or sentiments is not suf-
ficient for having them. Beliefs about feelings may often be right, but 
we’ll easily be misled and run afoul of much empirical psychology if we 
assume that people’s beliefs about their own mental states, including 
feelings and sentiments, are always right.6 
                                                                                                             
worthy happiness is unstable, since reality gets in and impinges on the affect of even the 
most willful self-deceiver. See section 4.1.1 for elaboration.  
 5As seems to happen in “Manhattan.” The Woody Allen condition will not, from here 
on out, play a big role in this essay. One reason, in addition to systematicity, that I in-
clude it in this section is that I want people to see that much of the unpleasantness they 
face in life is from the Woody Allen condition. Many Westerners are unhappy, despite 
being well fed, sheltered, and having friends to relate to. Compare this to the attitude of 
Duke Senior in As You Like It, whom I discuss in section 7. 
 6On this point, see especially Richard E. Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: 
Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 
1980).  
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 The distinctions of this section will play into the conclusions of this 
article as follows. The only kind of “happiness” that pursuing a policy of 
self-deception is at all likely to promote is Matrix happiness. Now you 
can divide Matrix happiness into two types. Some Matrix happiness will 
lead to choiceworthy happiness, since positive sentiment can breed posi-
tive action that yields genuine external goods. But some Matrix happi-
ness simply sets one up for a fall and disillusionment. The Matrix happi-
ness that a policy of self-deception produces is likely to be the latter sort. 
 Keep in mind that I’m focusing on the question of what’s the best 
policy. On the issue of whether self-deception can contribute to happi-
ness, people often raise individual examples of how self-deception can 
bring about happiness in particular circumstances. But to justify a policy 
of doing x for the sake of y, it is not enough for it to be possible for an 
instance of x to play a causal role in the occurrence of an instance of y; 
rather, making a policy of doing x for the sake of y is only justifiable, in 
general, if the occurrence of x can lead to a rational expectation of y in 
the circumstances one is actually in. So one example of a self-deception 
that led to happiness, choiceworthy or otherwise, will not refute my ar-
gument that it is not instrumentally rational to self-deceive for the sake of 
happiness. Suppose someone argues that it is bad to give sharp knives to 
children under the age of four. Would it refute this argument to show one 
possible case of a three-year-old child who did something good with a 
knife, for example, cut carrots? Or is that an exceptional behavior that in 
no way justifies the practice of giving children knives? Thus, to assess 
the policy, we’ll have to attend to the systematic features of the states in 
question, self-deception and happiness. Cases are relevant, but only inso-
far as they represent actual patterns.  
 
2.2. The policy of self-deception for the sake of happiness  
 
How might one hope to deceive oneself to become happy? One cannot 
turn self-deception on and off like flipping a switch, so a policy will be 
necessary. So one must adhere to habits that cultivate beliefs that one 
believes will cause happiness.7 
 In particular, one wishes to believe that certain negative propositions 
are not true (although the weight of one’s information suggests they are) 
and that certain positive propositions are true (although the evidence 
suggests otherwise). In order for it to be a policy of self-deception that 
one is pursuing, one must have beliefs already that are in tension with the 
desired beliefs. (I’ll explain why shortly.) This is an important difference 
                                                 
 7Immediately the worry arises: what if the self-deceptive policy also corrupts one’s 
ability to judge which beliefs will make one happy? I’ll develop versions of this worry 
below. 
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from most of the positive illusions that Taylor discusses, for her “healthy” 
subjects seem to be not at all divided on questions of whether they are, 
for example, more liked than most people (even though they aren’t) or 
are better drivers than most (even though they aren’t).  
 Along these lines, let’s draw a distinction for use in the wider argu-
ment. “Self-inflation bias” will refer to a general tendency to form be-
liefs about oneself that are more flattering than reality justifies, where 
those beliefs are not necessarily controverted by other information in the 
agent’s mind. For example, believing one is an above-average cook, 
where one has not much evidence for or against this, is most likely the 
product of self-inflation bias. “Self-deception,” on the other hand, refers 
either to a process or a state. “Self-deception” (as a state) occurs when a 
belief exists that is contrary to the evidence and epistemic norms an 
agent has, where motivations topically related to the content of this belief 
are causally implicated in its having come about.8 Self-deception (as a 
process) is how one comes to be in this state. Believing one’s wife has 
been faithful, when one is aware (at some level) of evidence to the con-
trary, is thus a state of self-deception, whenever the belief is caused by 
motivations such as wanting it to be the case that the wife has been faith-
ful or wanting to believe that she has been. Pre-theoretically, one might 
refer to self-inflation bias as a form of self-deception, but keeping them 
distinct will be important for this paper at certain points. In sum, the 
main differences between self-inflation bias and self-deception are two: 
(i) the self-deceiver is in some way epistemically divided, while this isn’t 
typically the case for someone merely in the grips of self-inflation bias; 
(ii) self-deception is caused by specific motivations or desires, while 
self-inflation bias is a general tendency. 
 Given this distinction, we can sharpen the focus of the paper. Pursu-
ing a policy of self-deception will mean attempting to form beliefs that 
are contrary to negative information about the self that one already pos-
sesses. It is this that I shall attempt to show does not lead to happiness. 
Nevertheless, some critical examination of Taylor’s work on positive 
illusions, which are often from self-inflation bias, will be useful for 
showing that her work doesn’t justify the policy of self-deception that I 
am opposing. 
 A policy of self-deception characteristically involves the following. 
One has views about which beliefs are desirable to have and which are 
desirable to get rid of. Desirable beliefs on this policy might have con-
tents such as: I am highly intelligent, my friends are attractive, my rela-
                                                 
 8See D.S. Neil Van Leeuwen, “Finite Rational Self-Deceivers,” Philosophical Studies 
139 (2008): 191-208, for a fleshed-out version of this definition, and “The Product of 
Self-Deception,” Erkenntnis 67 (2007): 419-37, for distinctions among types of self-
deception. 
 Self-Deception Won’t Make You Happy 113 
 
 
tionship is entirely healthy, and so on. The policy also involves a com-
mitment to ignoring (or explaining away) information that counts against 
the desired beliefs, and to actively attending to information that seems to 
confirm them.  
 Such commitments are common. If one has a rich Mafioso benefac-
tor, one might commit to ignoring evidence that the man is a killer, while 
actively seeking out evidence that he does good things for the commu-
nity. Sports fans, in the grips of the view that they must believe their 
team is the best, actively seek out evidence that would support this belief 
while ignoring evidence to the contrary. Mountains of contrary evidence 
are ignored; teaspoons of supporting evidence are celebrated. 
 About which topics will someone pursuing a policy of self-deception 
for the sake of happiness have practices of selective attention? One might, 
for example, ignore the fact that one rarely understands books, and focus 
on the clever comment one made the other day. But if one is already se-
cure in one’s intelligence, there will be no point in inflating one’s estima-
tion of it. If one is to pursue the policy I’m discussing, one must focus 
the self-deception on areas about which one is insecure. The hope is that 
once one has formed the self-deceptive belief that is meant to promote 
happiness, the insecurity will fall away.9  
 To summarize, there are four main elements of a policy of self-
deception for the sake of happiness. 
 
(1) Awareness of areas in one’s life that are felt to be lacking or about 
which one has insecurities. 
(2) On the basis of awareness of the sort mentioned in (1), selection10 of 
which beliefs will promote happiness by working against the ten-
dency toward negative affect the awareness engenders. 
(3) Commitment to attending to information that seems to confirm the 
beliefs selected in (2). 
(4) Commitment to ignoring evidence that disconfirms beliefs selected 
in (2). 
 
 The possible success of this policy will depend on the persistence of 
the commitments mentioned in (3) and (4) after the awareness mentioned 
in (1) has been extinguished, since that awareness is precisely the sort of 
thing that the policy is meant to extinguish. It’s not incoherent to suppose 
                                                 
 9This hope is not entirely vain, since there is empirical evidence that attempts at mem-
ory suppression are to some extent effective. See: Michael C. Anderson, Kevin N. Ochsner, 
Brice Kuhl, Jeffrey Cooper, Elaine Robertson, Susan W. Gabrieli, Gary H. Glover, and 
John D.E. Gabrieli, “Neural Systems Underlying the Suppression of Unwanted Memories,” 
Science 303 (2004): 232-35. It is not clear, however, to what extent suppressed memories 
actually go away as opposed to simply having a “cap” inhibiting access. 
 10It’s not necessary that this selection be conscious. 
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that persistence is possible, so I’ll rest my argument against this sort of 
policy on other grounds. Now let’s proceed with the wider argument to 
see whether Taylor’s empirical work offers anything that would help jus-
tify this sort of policy. 
 
 
3. Does Taylor’s Work on Positive Illusions Support Self-Deception? 
 
In the next three subsections, I’ll argue there are serious problems with 
using work such as Taylor’s in social psychology to infer that self-
deception can contribute to choiceworthy happiness. Such inference in-
volves a confused application of the term “illusion,” where the confusion 
can be of three varieties: (i) conflation of illusion with self-fulfilling con-
fidence that one can achieve a positive outcome in a certain domain, (ii) 
conflation of illusion with future-oriented imagining, and (iii) confusion 
of self-flattering belief, which is often illusory, with a justified sense of 
self-worth. 
 
3.1. “Illusions” of success? 
 
Taylor argues that positive illusions contribute not only to having posi-
tive feelings, but also to greater success in life. In my terms: Taylor holds 
that positive illusions, such as the belief that one is more well-liked than 
is actually the case, contribute to the attainment of choiceworthy happi-
ness. How are the illusions supposed to bring about their beneficial ef-
fects? The model is something like this:11 
 
 
What’s the argument that the first link obtains? Taylor cites a number of 
empirical studies that suggest that people who are more depressed have 
more accurate self-perception and others that suggest that people with 
positive illusions are happier.12 We may therefore accept that having un-
                                                 
 11Sometimes Taylor talks as if positive illusions in the form of beliefs cause the posi-
tive feelings. Other times she talks as if the feelings are just part of the illusions. I’ll as-
sume the first interpretation here. 
 12Taylor cites, among others, the following studies to support the correlation between 
depression and accurate appraisal: Nicholas A. Kuiper, “Depression and Causal Attribu-
tions for Success and Failure,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 36 (1978): 
236-46; Nicholas A. Kuiper and M.R. MacDonald, “Self and Other Perception in Mild 
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realistically flattering views of the self is correlated with not being de-
pressed. This is of course a far cry from having shown that unrealistic 
self-assessment causes positive feelings about the self. It may be that the 
two have a common cause, or that the positive feeling is causing the un-
realistic self-assessment.13 Nevertheless, let us grant this link for the time 
being so that we can get a better sense of the structure of Taylor’s view.  
 What about the second link in the diagram? What’s the argument that 
that obtains? The general idea, which is true, is that having a positive 
affect can have good consequences. Positive affect can make it easier to 
engage in relationships, easier to be productive, and easier to engage in 
healthy behaviors. So if these links obtain (granting the first), does that 
show that positive illusions cause genuine external goods?  
 Let’s focus on the word “illusion.” Often, the “illusions” Taylor refers 
to actually turn out true, at least if the model is correct. Thus it seems to 
be a conceptual confusion to call them “illusions,” since illusions are not 
things that turn out true. Let’s look at a specific example. In Chapter 2 of 
Positive Illusions, Taylor argues that illusions that one can succeed will 
lead to success. So we have: 
 
 
It may seem astounding that the word “illusion” is used at all here. But 
there is a more nuanced version of the view that Taylor is suggesting. 
The idea would be that having an unrealistically high estimation of the 
probability of success raises the probability of success, although not to 
the level of the unrealistically high assessment, which therefore still de-
serves the name “illusion.” This version of the view doesn’t suffer from 
the conceptual confusion that the simpler version suffered from, but I see 
no evidence that this is what is happening. In particular, Taylor presents 
no evidence that people in the kinds of contexts she focuses on are actu-
ally making probability estimates or anything like them. It may be that 
outcomes envisioned are brighter than those that typically come about, 
                                                                                                             
tion in the Attribution of Causality,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 87 (1978): 32-48. 
One example study cited in support of the correlation between positive affect and positive 
illusion is Neil D. Weinstein, “Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events,” Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology 39 (1980): 806-20. See Taylor’s Positive Illusions 
for more references. The follow-up literature is also substantial. 
 13I suggest that the direction of causality goes from positive affect to self-deception 
or illusion in my “Spandrels of Self-Deception,” Philosophical Psychology 20 (2007): 
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but that doesn’t indicate that there are any false beliefs about the present 
state of affairs or that any false beliefs that may exist are beneficial to the 
attainment of genuine external goods in the future. It just means that en-
visioning or imagining a brighter future is helpful. In fact, there are some 
interesting remarks that Taylor and Jonathan Brown make in response to 
criticisms of their views that suggest precisely that, although they don’t 
seem to realize the implication: 
 
When individuals are in a deliberative mindset, attempting to make a decision, their posi-
tive illusions are quite modest; but when they are in an implemental mindset, attempting 
to put a decision into effect, illusions increase dramaticially ... there may be windows of 
realism during which people suspend their illusions, at least somewhat, in favor of a more 
realistic vantage point.14 
 
There is some truth to this passage: individuals operate with more than 
one reservoir of representations, and they switch, depending upon what 
kind of practical setting they’re in. But the tendency to label as “illusion” 
every reservoir that’s not entirely reality-tracking is a mistake. Taylor 
and Brown appear to admit that when it’s needed, normal individuals are 
fairly good at keeping track of reality. Of course, when they need to “im-
plement” or produce actions, their representations of the future become 
exceptionally positive. But that doesn’t mean those representations are 
illusions, and the fact that reality is gripped in the background suggests 
they’re not. This takes us to the next section. 
 
3.2. Belief or imagining? 
 
People no doubt have many illusions about themselves and their lives. 
Taylor is right to study them. But in claiming that illusions lead to posi-
tive future outcomes, she also conflates having illusory beliefs about the 
self with having future-oriented imaginings. Let’s first consider an ex-
ample of genuinely illusory belief. Taylor writes: 
 
When people whose driving had involved them in accidents serious enough to involve 
hospitalization were interviewed about their driving skills and compared with drivers 
who had not had accident histories, the two groups gave almost identical descriptions of 
their driving abilities. Irrespective of their accident records, people judged themselves to 
be more skillful than average, and this was true even when the drivers involved in acci-
dents had been responsible for them.15 
 
The term “illusion” certainly applies to the majority of minds of at-fault 
drivers who judge themselves to be above-average drivers. But compare 
                                                 
 14Shelley E. Taylor and Jonathon D. Brown, “Positive Illusions and Well-Being Re-
visited: Separating Fact from Fiction,” Psychological Bulletin 116 (1994): 21-27, pp. 25-
26. 
 15Taylor, Positive Illusions, p. 11. 
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that with the optimism about the future that Taylor discusses in her chap-
ter entitled “Escape from Reality: Illusions in Everyday Life.” 
 
One of the more charming optimistic biases that people share is the belief that they can 
accomplish more in a given period of time than is humanly possible. This bias persists in 
the face of innumerable contradictions. Perhaps the most poignant example of unrealistic 
optimism is the daily to-do list. Each day, the well-organized person makes a list of the 
tasks to be accomplished and then sets out to get them done. Then the exigencies of the day 
begin to intrude: phone calls, minor setbacks, a miscalculation of how long a task will take, 
or a small emergency. The list that began the day crisp and white is now in tatters, with 
additions, cross-outs, and, most significantly, half its items left undone ... the pattern persists 
day after day, completely unresponsive to the repeated feedback that it is unrealistic.16 
 
It is surely problematic to categorize such future-oriented list-making as 
illusory. Of course, illusion may be in the background sometimes. But 
one needn’t be convinced that one will get through the entire list in order 
to make it up. Oftentimes the list just reflects a set of priorities and is 
made so that one not forget them. Where is the illusion in that? Argua-
bly, it makes sense to write down more than one can actually do, in case 
things go more smoothly than usual. It costs little to add an item to the 
list and can be beneficial. 
 The point is general, applying not only to the categorization of mental 
representations underlying list-making. Representation of future events 
needn’t be illusory, even if their contents are unlikely to end up true. It 
could simply be positive future-oriented imagining.  
 By lumping under the single label of “positive illusions” both self-
inflated positive beliefs and imagined future outcomes that are useful for 
planning, Taylor has done a disservice. Imagining can be valuable, even 
in cases in which the contents of one’s imagining depart widely from 
reality. When I exercise I sometimes imagine I’m an Olympic athlete, 
which motivates me to continue. There’s no illusion here, just imagining. 
The beneficial effect of positive imaginings does not show that real illu-
sions (like the driver illusion) lead to positive future outcomes, as Tay-
lor’s equivocal use of “illusion” suggests. 
 
3.3. What beliefs contribute to happiness? 
 
Does believing you’re a better driver than you are make you happier? 
Does believing you’re smarter than you are make you happier? Does be-
lieving your son is smarter than he is make you happier? It may be that 
beliefs like these are correlated with positive affect—with both Matrix 
and choiceworthy happiness. Do we have reason to believe that such be-
                                                 
 16Ibid., p. 34. She does not refer to the unrealistic optimism as “illusions” in the text, 
but the fact that they are discussed in a chapter with the heading “Illusions in Everyday 
Life” indicates that Taylor is thinking of them as such. 
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liefs cause positive affect to the extent that they must, if it is to make 
sense to have a policy of inculcating them via self-deception? 
 Many people know they are of above average intelligence and are de-
pressed nonetheless. An experienced taxi driver, who is surely an above 
average driver and knows it, can be depressed. Many unhappy fathers in 
the world know their sons or daughters are highly intelligent. These are 
all examples of people with true beliefs with contents like those posited 
in Taylor’s positive illusions. So I’m not convinced that such beliefs (il-
lusory or not) actually contribute causally to positive affect in more than 
a very temporary way. Conversely, many happy people know they’re not 
intellectual stars, know they’re not the best drivers, and know their chil-
dren may even be below average. So such beliefs are clearly not needed 
for happiness.  
 One might respond to these points by saying that although one posi-
tive belief or so might not yield happiness in any sense, having many 
positive beliefs in several domains would. But if self-deception were to 
be the means to that state of affairs, one would have to be committed to 
such a range of self-deceptions that it would put one in the category of 
delusional. Furthermore, a number of findings in psychology suggest that 
when high self-esteem is inflated or unfounded, individuals respond to 
perceived threats to their self-esteem with hostility.17 A disposition to-
ward hostility characterizes someone who is the opposite of sanguine. So 
self-esteem by self-deceptive inflation, which might really just be acting 
as if one has self-esteem, seems (again) a bad route to positive affect. 
 What I think is going on in the empirical studies that Taylor cites is 
that nondepressed people have a systematic tendency simply to overes-
timate various aspects of personal worth. But a likely interpretation of 
this finding is that the positive affect causes the overestimation (and not, 
as Taylor holds, vice versa). What’s the argument for this? Simply, if 
beliefs that attribute positive features cause positive affect, we’d expect 
not to see so many intelligent or good-looking or successful people who 
are unhappy. But there are many such people. But if positive affect 
causes self-flattering beliefs, then it’s possible for one to have beliefs that 
attribute positive features to oneself without having positive affect, 
where these beliefs arrived by another route. Furthermore, we’d still ex-
pect to see a correlation between positive affect and self-flattering belief, 
which is precisely what we find.18  
                                                 
 17Roy F. Baumeister, Laura Smart, and Joseph M. Boden, “Relation of Threatened 
Egotism to Violence and Aggression: The Dark Side of High Self-Esteem,” Psychologi-
cal Review 103 (1996): 5-33; Edward A. Johnson, Norah Vincent, and Leah Ross, “Self-
Deception versus Self-Esteem in Buffering the Negative Effects of Failure,” Journal of 
Research in Personality 31 (1997): 385-405. 
 18One thing that may be going on in the correlation between positive affect and overly 
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 Try this. Give the question of how good a driver you are serious con-
sideration. Come up with an estimate in terms of percentile of the popula-
tion on the basis of your driving history—accidents, tickets, near misses, 
and success in pulling into parking spaces. Knowing what you know about 
people’s tendencies to overestimate their driving abilities, you should 
probably lower the estimation you just made by about 15 percentile 
points. Now face it, that’s your driving ability. Does this realization 
make you any less happy? When I do this, I end up in the 50th percentile 
(initial estimate 65th, then adjust for bias). The realization that I’m not as 
good a driver as I thought has no effect whatsoever on my positive affect. 
I doubt it will for you either. I take this to be evidence that overestima-
tion of one’s abilities doesn’t have much influence on affect either way.  
 But it is not simply wrong that beliefs about the self with positive 
contents are needed to have positive affect. Depressed people are known 
for having repetitive thoughts with contents like I’m a loser and to dwell 
on their faults.19 What I wish to propose here is that belief in one’s worth 
as a human being is necessary for happiness. But this is a different kind 
of belief from beliefs with contents like I am above-average popular or I 
am above-average good-looking. It is even problematic to call the aware-
ness of one’s own worth as a human a belief. It is certainly not a belief 
with factual contents over which inferences are drawn of the sort dis-
cussed in contemporary epistemology. Let’s simply refer to what I’m 
talking about as sense of self-worth.  
 Do the positive illusions that Taylor discusses contribute to a sense of 
self-worth? Here again equivocation on “positive illusion” gives a mis-
leading impression. There is nothing illusory in a normal human being’s 
having a sense of self-worth. This is not to say that people lack faults, but 
simply that human beings do have worth and are justified in believing so. 
If it were possible for slugs to have a sense of self-worth, it would per-
haps be illusory for them to have it, but it is not illusory for humans—no 
matter how average or below average in looks, intelligence, or driving 
ability. Nor do illusions on such issues plausibly contribute to a sense of 
self-worth.  
*  *  * 
 
Let me summarize the critical points made thus far. Although there is 
empirical evidence that (many of) the “illusions” that Taylor studies are 
                                                                                                             
positive views concerning the self is that the agent is interpreting her positive mood. If one 
feels a certain way, one seeks to explain that feeling, which causes one to look around 
and find positive or negative propositions about the self that may be believed. 
 19For an example study, see Jennifer A. Harrington and Virginia Blankenship, “Ru-
minative Thoughts and Their Relation to Depression and Anxiety,” Journal of Applied 
Social Psychology 32 (2002): 465-85. 
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correlated with positive affect—and thus happiness—her use of “illu-
sion” is fraught with equivocation. An “illusion” one can succeed is no 
illusion, if it leads to success. Such a doxastic state is better labeled 
something like true belief in one’s abilities or, more generally, self-
fulfilling belief. Second, imagining future outcomes for the sake of plan-
ning or giving oneself an orientation is not illusion. Third, a sense of 
self-worth, which does contribute to choiceworthy happiness, is not illu-
sory, since all humans have worth. So the illusions Taylor discusses that 
actually are illusions have not been shown to be worthy contributors to 
positive affect or, more seriously, to choiceworthy happiness.  
 
 
4. Three Arguments that Self-Deception Does Not Produce Happiness 
 
I’ve argued that the empirical evidence that prima facie favors a policy of 
self-deception for the sake of happiness does not actually support that 
policy. It is a mistake to conflate positive illusions with a policy of self-
deception, and the illusions themselves haven’t been shown to do any-
thing for happiness. Support for the policy has thus been removed. Now 
I’ll offer arguments for rejecting it altogether. 
 
4.1. What does self-deception do to desire satisfaction? 
 
Having true beliefs enables people to accomplish things. I need to be-
lieve what my options are before I can choose among them. Having be-
liefs about what the outcomes of chosen options will be guides choice. If 
any of the beliefs mentioned in this general schema is false—either about 
the options or outcomes—then I’m likely to end up dissatisfied. So false 
belief tends toward dissatisfaction. But self-deception leads to false be-
lief. So self-deception tends toward dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction tends 
away from happiness (both Matrix and choiceworthy). So self-deception 
tends away from happiness. A person wishing to promote her happiness, 
therefore, would be mistaken to pursue a policy of self-deception for that 
end.  
 This line of reasoning seems so basic that I find it remarkable that 
anyone could champion self-deception as a means to happiness at all. 
How might that champion of self-deception respond? 
 The champion of self-deception notes, first of all, that there are some 
things in life over which one has no control, but which affect happiness 
nonetheless. One can’t control one’s innate components of looks or intel-
ligence, for example. So the general recipe for self-deception to promote 
happiness, so the line goes, involves not self-deception about those 
things one can control, but about those things one can’t control. The idea 
is that since one is stuck in a given position, there’s no point in having 
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true beliefs about it, especially if they make one feel bad. So argues the 
champion of self-deception. 
 Three points, however, are noteworthy. First, we’re out of the terri-
tory of vying for choiceworthy happiness, so the champion of self-
deception who takes this line has resolved to settle for Matrix happiness, 
at least locally. Furthermore, the Matrix happiness is unlikely to last, 
since evidence of the reality one is denying is likely to come in at some 
point. Second, even though one can’t change the innate components of 
intelligence or looks (or whatever), having false beliefs on these matters 
can still undermine desire satisfaction. Oftentimes, knowing one’s limita-
tions is essential to making the optimal choices in compensating for 
them. Third—and this point is often overlooked—self-deception also 
undermines one’s ability to know which are the situations one has control 
over and can make improvements on and which aren’t. In short, self-
deception (assuming it could be useful at all in the short term) under-
mines cognition of the conditions under which it could (supposedly) be 
useful. Let’s go over each of these points in more detail. 
 
4.1.1. Self-deceptive Matrix happiness is temporary 
 
Suppose that the aspects of one’s appearance that one feels bad about are 
not possible to alter through exercise or other means. And suppose that 
deceiving oneself plausibly could make one feel better about those as-
pects. (I shall argue in section 5 that self-deception is unlikely to succeed 
even at this, but let’s grant the champion of self-deception this point for 
now.) All that is accomplished by this self-deception is a slight contribu-
tion to global Matrix happiness, without a genuine increase in external 
goods. There is certainly no increase in attractive appearance, and, given 
that, there won’t be any increase in the other external goods one might 
hope to obtain as a consequence of being good-looking. Thus, the Matrix 
happiness is likely to be intruded upon. Suppose the practice of self-
deception were successful. One is likely to face perpetual disappointment 
and alarm at not being treated as good-looking, given the self-deceptive 
belief that one is. Thus, this is the kind of Matrix happiness that tends in 
the direction of its own undoing. And the disappointment at not being 
treated as good-looking may even be greater than if one were self-
honest, given the expectations set up by the self-deceptive belief. 
 The champion of self-deception might respond that the extra boost of 
self-confidence one gets from self-deceptive belief in one’s good looks 
will have other positive consequences, such as being more relaxed in 
social situations, which will arguably lead to being more liked and hav-
ing more friends. But the claim is tenuous. There would need to be links 
between self-deceptive belief in one’s good looks and self-confidence 
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and between the resulting self-confidence and social success. But it is not 
likely that the self-deceptive belief will actually produce the required 
self-confidence, given that the state of self-deception involves, at some 
level of cognition, information to the contrary of the self-deceptive belief 
in one’s attractiveness. Furthermore, most people find those with inflated 
opinions of themselves off-putting, particularly when the inflated opinion 
is based on false belief that masks insecurity.20 So both purported causal 
links (between the self-deceptive belief and the “self-confidence” and 
between the self-confidence and the social success) are dubious. In any 
case, why would one choose the tenuous strategy of improving social 
relations by self-deceptive belief that one is good-looking as opposed to 
something straightforward, like being friendly to people?  
 Analogous considerations apply to the elements of Matrix happiness 
that one might seek to construct on the basis of other self-deceptive be-
liefs, such as a self-deceptive belief that one is more popular than one 
actually is. Disappointment is likely. 
 
4.1.2. More ways self-deception can undermine desire satisfaction  
 
Recall that the champion of self-deception is arguing that there are situa-
tions to which the reasoning I started section 4 with doesn’t apply. (The 
reasoning was that self-deception undermines happiness because false 
beliefs undermine one’s ability to get what one wants. The response was 
that there are some situations one can’t change, so one might as well be 
self-deceived about them to feel better.) My present point is that even if 
situation A can’t be changed, having true beliefs about A might be 
needed for getting what one wants in situation B. So it doesn’t follow 
that the fixedness of A makes self-deception about A immune to the 
problem of undermining desire satisfaction by causing false beliefs.  
 Suppose I am self-deceived that my son has great intellectual abilities, 
when he is in fact of quite ordinary intellect. The champion of self-
deception says: “Why not be self-deceived? It might make you feel bet-
ter. And you can’t at this point change those portions of his DNA that 
influence native intelligence anyway.” But, although one can’t change a 
person’s native intellectual gifts, having an accurate assessment of the 
                                                 
 20One main upshot of the longitudinal and laboratory studies presented by Randall 
Colvin et al. is that individuals with a tendency toward self-enhancement (a form of self-
deception) display behaviors that seem detrimental to positive social interactions, as 
judged by third-party observers. The authors’ interpretation of why this is so meshes well 
with what I say here: “A deep albeit perhaps unrecognized and unacknowledged sense of 
uneasiness consequently may pervade the self-enhancer, hardly a condition conducive to 
mental health.” C. Randall Colvin, Jack Block, and David C. Funder, “Overly Positive 
Self-Evaluations and Personality: Negative Implications for Mental Health,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 68 (1995): 1152-62, p. 1161. 
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intellectual abilities of a child is needed for finding him the kind of help 
needed for his fullest possible development, given whatever his native 
abilities are. If I believe he is a natural at math, that might cause me to 
make two kinds of mistake. On the one hand, I might not get him the 
help he needs, which thwarts my desire for him to develop as much as 
possible; this is a sin of omission, resulting from the failure to have an 
accurate assessment. On the other hand, I, as a self-deceived father, might 
push to have him in a more difficult class than he can handle, which would 
result in great difficulty for him and much disappointment for me; this is 
a sin of commission, resulting from having an inaccurate assessment.  
 It’s true that one can wrongly estimate a child’s abilities without self-
deception and make mistakes on how to raise the child on the basis of 
nonself-deceptive false beliefs. But the self-honest person is in a far bet-
ter position to correct her mistakes than the self-deceiver, since the self-
honest person has a commitment to updating beliefs on the basis of in-
coming information, while the self-deceiver must be committed to ignor-
ing, discounting, or tendentiously reinterpreting incoming information. 
Thus, although one can’t change a child’s natural intellectual abilities, 
having an honest assessment of them is critical to making the right 
choices on further matters.  
 Perhaps another example is more favorable to the champion of self-
deception. Suppose you have compelling evidence that by most eviden-
tial lights would get one to believe that your wife had an affair several 
years ago. Should you focus on the scanty evidence that she was faithful 
(she says she was) and ignore the mountain of evidence that she wasn’t 
(emotional unavailability, lack of interest in sex, unexplained absences, 
frequent sightings of her with a male co-worker), and thereby, in the sup-
posed interest of happiness, pursue a policy of self-deception on the mat-
ter? What good could having true beliefs on the matter bring about? It 
might seem that believing the truth in this case would be pointless, since 
the mooted event is far enough in the past, while believing falsely she 
was faithful could (it seems) alleviate your uneasiness on the matter. But 
good relationships require communication, and lack of honesty on one 
issue will lead to silence on many others. Inability to talk about some-
thing that happened in the past will lead to inability on her part to talk 
about the sorts of things that made the relationship problematic in the 
first place. In short, if you desire communication in the relationship, you 
should at least be open to the kind of information that self-deception 
would shut out. So again, self-deception is likely to undermine getting 
what you want. 
 There are two general points here: (i) true beliefs are needed for de-
sire satisfaction often in ways that aren’t obvious or predictable, and (ii) 
the shutting-off of information that’s needed for self-deception under-
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mines knowledge beyond the specific proposition about which one is 
self-deceived. The consequent lack of knowledge is also damaging to 
desire satisfaction as much as the specific false belief implicated in the 
self-deception. 
 
4.1.3. How does the self-deceiver know what to be self-deceived about? 
 
Finally, the champion of self-deception is now relying on the argument 
that in certain situations (those over which one has no control) self-
deception can contribute to feeling better. The question is: How is the 
person pursuing a policy of self-deception to know the difference be-
tween situations the policy applies to and ones it doesn’t apply to? Take 
again the case of the father self-deceived about his son’s intelligence. On 
complicated matters, like the intelligence of a child, there will be ways in 
which one can contribute and be helpful, as well as aspects of the situa-
tion one cannot change. To know the difference between the aspects of 
the child’s mind one can help and the aspects one cannot, one has to be 
responsive to the evidence the child provides of his abilities. A policy of 
self-deception is deliberately contrary to such responsiveness. One is 
likely to end up being self-deceived not just about the native abilities of 
the child, but also about abilities one could help improve. In short, self-
deception, even on the assumption it ever could be helpful for happiness, 
undermines awareness of the conditions for its own helpfulness.  
 
*  *  * 
 
To sum up this section: Reasoning based on true beliefs is needed for 
desire satisfaction. Self-deception is contrary to true belief and hence 
tends away from desire satisfaction and happiness. Arguments in favor of 
self-deception ignore the damage that self-deception does to truthful 
cognition on matters of practical importance. Whether or not self-
deception promotes Matrix happiness, it is contrary to choiceworthy 
happiness, since it undermines the attainment of genuine external goods. 
 I argue next that self-deception even undermines Matrix happiness. 
 
 
5. The Internal State of the Self-Deceiver 
 
Recall the distinction between the self-inflation bias and self-deception. 
Self-deception involves an internal tension in the mind between the 
weight of the evidence and the self-deceptive belief, while in self-
inflation bias this need not be the case. Now, if you’re to make a policy 
of self-deception for the sake of happiness, “self-deception”—not “self-
inflation bias”—is the correct term for what you’re doing. Self-inflation 
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bias is a general tendency not wedded to specific desires, while self-
deception is by nature motivated by specific desires, like the desire for 
happiness. Having seen this, let’s consider the internal mental state of the 
self-deceiver and its consequences for affect. 
 The cognitive state of the self-deceiver is, in a way, quite ordinary. 
Every ordinary cognizer has a large body of beliefs and stored informa-
tion that she is not accessing for the purposes of choice and inference at 
any given time. So it is with the self-deceiver. What marks the difference 
between the ordinary cognizer and the self-deceiver is that the former, 
when a given piece of unattended knowledge becomes relevant, has no 
obstacles to attending to that knowledge. When you’re hungry, represen-
tations of nearby restaurants cross your conscious mind; when you’re 
tired, you naturally think of where the nearest bed or couch is; when your 
child has a cut, you recall where the band-aids are. The self-deceiver, on 
the other hand, resists considering unattended knowledge that runs con-
trary to the self-deceptive belief. It may seem remarkable that the self-
deceiver can do this. And perhaps it is. But it is much more remarkable 
that attention works as well as it does in the first place. You have infor-
mation on thousands of topics stored in long-term memory; it is quite 
mysterious how and by what process the right bits of information come 
into consciousness at the times when they’re relevant. 
 Evidently, unattended beliefs, or unconscious bits of information stored 
in long-term memory, have a property that makes them salient to atten-
tion when their contents become relevant to the practical interests of the 
agent. Let’s designate this property of unattended beliefs their call. I do 
not make any theoretical claims about what the call is like or whether it 
is a property intrinsic to each unattended belief or a property of the sys-
tem as a whole. I only claim that such a property must exist if we are to 
account for the efficacy with which previously unattended information be-
comes conscious whenever it is relevant to a matter under consideration. 
 What happens in self-deception is that the call of unattended but rele-
vant beliefs is ignored, and beliefs contrary to the agent’s total evidence 
and epistemic norms are formed on the basis of what limited evidence is 
attended to. Attending to the call is avoided either because it promises 
immediate discomfort or because attending would be contrary to a self-
deceptive policy, as in the sort of self-deception we’re now considering. 
 Ignoring the call does not make it go away. When one is in a state of 
self-deception, there are two relevant features in play. First, the agent has 
evidence, stored in the form of unattended beliefs, that something is ac-
tually the case that’s contrary to her desires or what she wishes to be-
lieve. Second, the call to attend to these beliefs is ignored.  
 To better understand what this psychic state is like, consider what 
happens when the first feature obtains while the second doesn’t. That is, 
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states in which one has unattended beliefs that indicate something is true 
that’s contrary to one’s wishes, but one does go on to attend to the rele-
vant (previously unattended) subject matters. We have several phrases to 
describe the combination of cognition and affect that ensues from this. 
One says, on accepting the truth of the undesirable consequence: “It’s 
been weighing heavily on my mind.” Or: “I’ve had a sneaking suspi-
cion.” Or: “I feared it was the case.” Or: “It’s been eating away at me.” 
Each of these phrases indicates that a judgment has been formed. What’s 
notable for present purposes, however, is that in each case the speaker 
seems to admit having been in some sort of unpleasant psychic state 
prior to the formation of the judgment—in other words, prior to answer-
ing the call of the unattended beliefs. Suppose now that one does not an-
swer the call and thus leaves the beliefs unattended. It stands to reason 
that the unpleasant state of mind will simply continue. Far from produc-
ing a sanguine state of blissful Matrix happiness, therefore, self-
deception is likely to result in a prolonged state of low-grade anxiety.21  
 The existence of this prolonged state of anxiety is further suggested 
the by phenomenon Freud observed known as reaction formation. Reac-
tion formation is a tendency stridently to assert or advocate the contrary 
of what the agent suppresses (ignores the call of). For example, Henry 
Adams, Lester Wright, and Bethany Lohr have produced evidence that 
males who exhibit the greatest amounts of homophobia also exhibit 
greater levels of arousal in response to gay pornography than nonhomo-
phobic males.22 The present point is that the defensiveness and vitriol of 
the person who exhibits reaction formation point to an unpleasant psy-
chological state, not a state of one who is relaxed or happy.  
 The champion of self-deception will say “ignorance is bliss.” But re-
gardless of whether that slogan is ever true, the person in a state of self-
deception is not simply ignorant of the matter about which she is self-
deceived. Unlike the merely ignorant, the self-deceiver has possession, at 
some level, of information that is “weighing on her mind” or “eating 
away at her,” even if she won’t admit it.23  
 To conclude this section, insofar as the mental state designated by 
such phrases as “eating away at” is unpleasant, self-deception results in 
an unpleasant mental state and thus tends away from Matrix happiness as 
                                                 
 21See the previous footnote for a reference to outside support for this claim. 
 22Henry E. Adams, Lester W. Wright, Jr., and Bethany A. Lohr, “Is Homophobia 
Associated With Homosexual Arousal?” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 105 (1996): 
440-45. 
 23There is also evidence that avoiding confrontation with unpleasant cognitions can 
be unhealthy bodily as well as mentally. See, for example, D.A. Weinberger, “Not Wor-
rying Yourself Sick: The Health Consequences of Repressive Coping,” paper presented at 
the 100th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, 
D.C., August 1992. 
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well as choiceworthy happiness. The champion of self-deception will 
respond that the psychic stress from admitting the unpleasant truth is 
greater than the unpleasantness of having the ignored information eat 
away at one. I doubt this is so. But it is an empirical question, and I know 
of no studies or metrics that weigh this precise trade-off. For my part, 
I’ve felt relief in the past upon being disabused of various self-deceptions. 
But in any case, ignoring information in one’s mind that points in an un-
pleasant direction does indeed have a psychic toll. Given that, the ra-
tional thing is to attend to that information, as this gives the best pros-
pects for figuring one’s way out of a hard situation.  
 
 
6. What Kind of Happiness? 
 
There is a curious tension in the position of the champion of self-
deception. On the one hand, she defends self-deception as a means to 
happiness by saying that deceiving ourselves into positive affect will 
give us the bright outlook that will positively influence the world around 
us. On the other hand, part of the strategy for defending self-deception 
has been to say that sometimes we are powerless to change a situation, 
and, given that, we might as well convince ourselves that the situation is 
better than it actually is. I have attempted to cast doubt on both of these 
positions in the course of this essay: (i) it’s not clear that illusory positive 
self-inflation contributes to the right kind of positive affect; (ii) it’s not 
clear that letting unpleasant evidence fester in the mind unattended is 
pleasanter than accepting the truth and moving on. But my point here is 
that both defenses of self-deception cannot be made for the same self-
deception. The “positive affect changes the future” defense presupposes 
the agent has some sort of control over the surrounding environment on 
the matter about which she deceives herself. The “can’t change the situa-
tion anyway” defense presupposes that the agent can’t change the envi-
ronment about which she deceives herself.  
 The question then is: In which kind of situation is self-deception con-
ducive to improving happiness, situations in which there is control over 
the environment or situations in which there isn’t? 
 The champion of self-deception will exuberantly say “both!” The 
champion of truth will say “neither!” The question here is whether there 
is any incoherence in saying “both.” It seems to me that there is. The per-
son who holds that it is both advisable to self-deceive in situations one 
has control over and in situations one has no control over adopts a policy 
of self-deceiving just about whenever there is something unpleasant in 
life. Now, such a committed self-deceiver trying to make a bad situation 
out to be better than it is will self-deceive into believing that she can 
positively change the bad aspects of the situation. It follows that the per-
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son who says “both” is committed not just to self-deceiving in both kinds 
of situation, but also to confusing which type of situation she is in. But 
then what should the contents of her self-deceptions be? That the bad 
situation is good? Or that she can change it? The self-deception of the 
person who is in a situation she can’t change is supposed to have con-
tents that make the situation out to be better than it actually is, which 
would tend in the direction of not trying to change things. The self-
deception of the person who is in a situation she can change for the better 
is supposed to make the situation out to be better than it is in terms of its 
potential for being positively influenced, that is, changed. The former 
self-deception tends in the direction of idleness; the latter tends in the di-
rection of action. But the person committed to the utility of self-deception 
in both situation types, we have seen, undermines her ability to tell which 
situation type she is in and hence which sort of self-deceptive contents she 
should pursue. Her policy has become incoherent. She is a fly in the glass 
jar of her own self-deceptions. 
 It remains to the champion of self-deception to retreat to the position 
that self-deception is useful in one situation type or the other. In the next 
section, I’ll argue that any benefit that might come from self-deception in 
situations that one has some control over can be better achieved through 
honest imagining. So I’ll take up here one last time the position that self-
deception might be of benefit in those situations over which one has no 
control.  
 Let’s assume for the time being that self-deception-produced Matrix 
happiness is the best I can hope for if I’m in a bad situation I can’t 
change. Suppose I’m in prison, with rough fellow inmates, no library, 
and bad food. It may be that self-deceptively convincing myself of the 
goodness of this situation will make me feel good temporarily. But this 
will be an unstable state, constantly intruded upon by confrontation with 
the actual inmates, lack of resources, and food. It follows that if there is a 
situation one is in about which it makes sense at all to self-deceive, the 
self-deception will be an ongoing endeavor. Furthermore, the belief that 
the situation is better than it is sets one up with a host of expectations, 
which are sure to be disappointed. So the Matrix happiness that ensues 
from self-deception will have at least three undesirable properties: 
 
(1) It will be frequently interrupted by facts of the situation. 
(2) It will be hard to maintain. 
(3) It will be accompanied by disappointment one could have avoided 
were it not for the self-deceptive belief. 
 
The question immediately arises: is this sort of “happiness” worth pursu-
ing even in situations over which one has no control? I conjecture it is 
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not. It is, again, an empirical question—one which we may not even have 
the concepts to investigate properly—whether the psychic toll of admit-
ting the badness of one’s situation is greater or less than the psychic toll 
of maintaining the uneasy self-deception needed for local and temporary 
Matrix happiness, coupled with its added disappointments that ensue 
from false expectations. But the present point is that the Matrix happi-
ness ensuing from self-deception (in the only situation types in which it 
could make sense to self-deceive) is not a desirable thing in and of itself, 
irrespective of whether it compares well or badly with the self-honest 
option in unalterable bad circumstances.  
 So the policy of self-deception for the sake of happiness seems to 
have a chance of fairing better than self-honesty only in situations that 
are bad and in which one can’t alter the circumstances, and even then the 
outcome of the policy is not that good. But the problem is that the policy 
of self-deception undermines one’s ability to tell whether one is in the 
kind of situation for which self-deception might (dubiously) be appropri-
ate. Thus, if one follows the policy, one might end up pursuing it in 
situations in which far better and rationally defensible options are avail-
able. It seems to me to follow that a policy of self-deception for the sake 
of happiness is a bad policy.  
 
 
7. A Self-Honest Approach 
 
In Shakespeare’s As You Like It, the Duke Senior and his friends are 
driven from their court by the Duke’s nefarious brother, Duke Frederick. 
They take up residence in the Forest of Ardenne, where the Duke Senior 
gives this speech: 
 
DUKE SENIOR 
 Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile, 
 Hath not old custom made this life more sweet 
 Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods 
 More free from peril than the envious court? 
 Here feel we not the penalty of Adam, 
 The seasons’ difference, as the icy fang 
 And churlish chiding of the winter’s wind, 
 Which, when it bites and blows upon my body, 
 Even till I shrink with cold, I smile and say, 
 “This is no flattery. These are counselors 
 That feelingly persuade me what I am.” 
 Sweet are the uses of adversity, 
 Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous, 
 Wears yet a precious jewel in his head. 
 And this our life, exempt from public haunt, 
 Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, 
 Sermons in stones, and good in everything. 
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Is the Duke deceiving himself? A simplistic reading would say that he is, 
that he is trying to convince himself that a bad situation is good and is 
thereby at least attempting to deceive himself. But notice that his think-
ing does not have the usual form of self-deception. He is not ignoring the 
cold that bites him, nor is he attempting to convince himself that it is less 
harsh or “not so bad,” as the self-deceiver might. Rather, the Duke is 
fully cognizant of the harshness of his new environment and embraces it. 
Furthermore, what makes it sweet to him is that he can learn from the 
very adversity. This theme of embracing adversity in its role as a teacher 
(“sermons in stones”) and thereby finding “good in everything” is in fact 
in direct opposition to the idea that self-deception brings happiness. 
 The Duke is attending to the reality around him and using his imagi-
nation to craft a path from the situation to a state of well-being. Nor is 
the path that his imagination constructs at all unrealistic. He can learn 
from his harsh environment, and is aided in doing so by not being en-
cumbered by the many distractions of the court. In order to conceive the 
Duke’s mindset as a state of self-deception, one must conflate two differ-
ent kinds of state: (i) imagining a positive future outcome that can be 
constructed out of present adversity, and (ii) believing (self-deceptively) 
that the present circumstances are not adverse. (This is, of course, very 
much like the conflation I pointed out in Taylor’s work earlier in this 
essay. Recall that she put daily list-making in a chapter entitled “Escape 
from Reality: Illusions in Everyday Life.” It is as if Taylor doesn’t have 
the attitude of imagining in her psychological ontology, and thus lumps 
together anything that the agent happens to represent in the category of 
belief, which would lead one to think of many imaginings as illusions.)  
 I propose that we call the Duke’s state of mind honest imagining. This 
is a state with four components: 
 
(1) One attends to all aspects of the situation one can that are of practical 
interest; 
(2) One straightforwardly applies her usual epistemic standards to what 
is cognized via the process referred to in (1) in order to form beliefs; 
(3) One uses imagination to envision one or more possible ways to be 
happy in the circumstances one acknowledges one is in via the be-
liefs referred to in (2); 
(4) One uses imagination to envision a route from the present situation 
to one of the ways to be happy envisioned via the process referred to 
in (3).  
 
 I hold that whatever gains in choiceworthy happiness one might hope 
for out of self-deception can be far better gotten through honest imagin-
ing. Whatever advantages there are to the positive illusions of the sort 
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that Taylor discusses, they most likely accrue simply from the fact that 
the agent has bothered to represent something involving a good outcome. 
Representation helps the agent choose actions that will help bring the 
good outcome about. If one is self-deceived, one gets the representation 
of the positive outcome, but one is then crippled with respect to learning 
whatever else needs to be brought about or changed in order to achieve 
it. This is not an advantageous position to be in. If one has honest imag-
ining, one has the advantages of representing the positive outcome, with-






The kind of mistake Taylor makes at a theoretical level can be made at a 
practical individual level. In fact, this is what might lead one into a pol-
icy of self-deception in the first place. People often hold that they must 
believe a good outcome will come about in order for it to come about. 
This leads to self-deception about the indicators that suggest the good 
outcome won’t happen. But there is both something right and something 
wrong about the dogma that one must believe a good outcome will hap-
pen. What’s right is that one must have a representation in mind of the 
good outcome, otherwise one couldn’t select actions that construct a path 
toward it. But what’s wrong is the idea that the representation must be a 
belief.  
 Let’s review the argumentation of this essay. The project has been to 
assess the view that a policy of self-deception would be a practically ra-
tional way to promote happiness. The idea is simply that if we paint 
things as better for ourselves than they actually are, we’ll be happier. 
One might take further support for this stance from the research program 
in social psychology that suggests positive illusions are conducive to 
mental health. I have suggested that this line of reasoning rests on a 
number of confusions. Matrix happiness must be separated from choice-
worthy happiness; self-deception must be separated from self-inflation 
                                                 
 24There is a complication here that I won’t go into for lack of space, but feel com-
pelled at least to point out. One might ask: How extravagant or conservative should the 
contents of the imaginings referred to in steps 3 and 4 be? If the outcomes imagined are 
too improbable, they risk being not useful. If too conservative or easy to bring about, they 
risk not being a genuine path to happiness. Two things can be said. First, one should 
probably imagine a range of possibilities, from the more conservative to the more ex-
travagant. This is one advantage that imagining has over belief: greater latitude in the 
range of normatively acceptable possible contents. Second, it is unlikely that there will be 
a systematic theory of how extravagant the imagining should be. Rather, the Aristotelian 
notion of the mean seems to apply. Thanks to Ville Paukkonen for raising this issue. 
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bias; illusion must be separated both from true belief in one’s abilities 
and self-fulfilling prophesy, on the one hand, and from imagining, on the 
other. In addition to disentangling the confusions, I argued that the policy 
in question is: (i) unsupported by the actual empirical evidence there is, 
(ii) destructive to the satisfaction of desires and goals, (iii) self-
undermining, (iv) likely to contribute to a state of mental unrest, and (v) 
inferior to the policy of honest imagining.  
 Why is the idea that self-deception can contribute to happiness so se-
ductive? There seem to be three main reasons. It has an air of insightful-
seeming paradoxicality which works like revelation on minds that fail to 
see the right distinctions. More importantly, however, the prevalence of 
self-deception leads people to assume that it must have some function. 
Hence Taylor calls the illusions she describes “adaptive,” a term she uses 
in the sense of “useful.” But it doesn’t seem to me that self-deception is 
adaptive, either in the evolutionary sense or in the sense of being useful 
for everyday life. I have argued extensively elsewhere that the capacity 
for self-deception is a byproduct, or spandrel, of features of the human 
mind that are beneficial for reasons other than their being implicated in 
producing self-deception.25 Whether or not this is true, the simple possi-
bility that self-deception is a spandrel should alleviate the pressure we 
might feel to give it a functional interpretation. And even if we do give it 
a functional interpretation, we may still be quite wrong that the function 
is happiness. It is commonplace in evolutionary thinking about the mind 
that adapted features of cognition and volition often do not tend in the 
direction of happiness. The final reason why the idea I have attacked 
here is seductive is, I believe, laziness. It seems easier to change a cogni-
tion than to change reality, so we might as well self-deceive to become 
happy. But mismanagement arising from laziness often leads to more 
work in the long run than if one had been diligent in the first place; so it 
is with cognitive mismanagement, or self-deception. There is a mental 
toll to ignoring the call of relevant but unsettling information, and there 
is a toll to missing opportunities to interact positively with the external 
world one has thereby ignored. In short, self-deception won’t make you 
happy.26 
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 25Van Leeuwen, “Finite Rational Self-Deceivers” and “Spandrels of Self-Deception.” 
 26I’d like to thank Wes Holliday, Alfred Mele, John Perry, and Allen Wood for their 
insightful comments on an earlier draft. I wrote this paper while supported by a fellow-
ship from the Center for Cultural Analysis at Rutgers University. 
